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An efficiency framework for valence processing
systems inspired by soft cross-wiring
P Read Montague1,2, Kenneth T Kishida1,4, Rosalyn J Moran3
and Terry M Lohrenz1
Recent experiments suggest that subsecond dopamine
delivery to human striatum encodes a combination of reward
prediction errors and counterfactual errors thus composing the
actual with the possible into one neurochemical signal. Here,
we present a model where the counterfactual part of these
striatal dopamine fluctuations originates in another valuation
system that shadows the dopamine system by acting as its
near-antipode in terms of spike-rate encoding yet co-releases
dopamine alongside its own native neurotransmitter. We show
that such a hypothesis engenders important representational
consequences where valence processing appears subject to
the efficient encoding considerations common to the visual and
auditory systems. This new perspective opens up important
computational consequences for understanding how value-
predicting information should integrate with sensory
processing streams.
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Counterfactual signaling encoded by striatal
dopamine fluctuations
Recent work in human striatum has provided electro-
chemical evidence that subsecond dopamine fluctuations
carry information related to two distinct kinds of error
signals — Firstly, reward prediction error (as anticipated
by a large literatures in rodents and primates) and finally,
counterfactual error encoding [1]. The authors note that
the ‘compositional encoding of ‘actual’ and ‘possible’ is
consistent with how one should ‘feel’ and may be one
example of how the human brain translates computations
over experience to embodied states of subjective feeling’
[1]. In contrast with this lofty possibility, we present a
computational perspective on the findings that exploits
the hypothesis that the counterfactual signals carried by
dopamine arise in a paired system that nearly anti-corre-
lates with dopaminergic encoding of prediction errors in
reward but is ideally suited to predict future aversive
stimuli. The motivating finding is shown in Figure 1.
The idea proposed by Kishida and colleagues was that
some other source/sink for dopamine existed that could
encode information about foregone gains and losses
(encoded in the game by bet level [1]). In the game,
subjects saw a stationary price trace, placed a bet
expressed as a fraction of their total holdings between
0% and 100%, the price fluctuated to its next value, and
losses or gains occurred. Subsecond dopamine measure-
ments in the human striatum encoded signed fluctuations
around a running estimate of the mean outcome, but also
showed a dependence on the bet level, which suggested
that dopamine was encoding a combination of reward
prediction errors in outcome (which scales positively with
the price fluctuation) and a separate part that scaled
negatively with the price fluctuation (which they termed
the counterfactual error). There are many counterfactual
errors one can define in this simple game, but Kishida and
colleagues specifically meant the foregone gains or losses
compared to how well or poorly things might have gone in
the extreme (bets all in or all out, see [1]).
Several possibilities ensue from these observations. First,
it is possible that midbrain dopamine neurons, in the
context of this simple cognitive challenge, have prediction
error and counterfactual error computations available and
encoded appropriately as changes in spike rate. The
reason this has not been observed before is that prior
work never really challenged an animal in the same way
(with parametrically connected foregone gains and losses;
see Figure 1) while recording either dopaminergic spikes
or dopamine fluctuations at target projection sites. A
second possibility, a version of the first, is the existence
of another population of dopaminergic neurons (not pre-
viously described) that modulate their activity oppositely
to dopaminergic neurons and effectively add/subtract
dopamine from baseline extracellular levels as a near-
opponent to the prediction error encoding long described
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for these neurons. A third possibility is that some neuronal
population that nearly anti-correlates with the dopaminer-
gic modulation during reward-based tasks releases dopa-
mine because it is capable of loading dopamine into its
terminals rather than manufacturing it itself, and does so in
the same regions of the dorsal striatum (the primary
recording site of Kishida and colleagues). This latter
possibility falls into the opponent process hypothesis
(see [2,3]).
To summarize the possibilities: (1) midbrain dopamine
neurons known for generating reward prediction error
signals also generate spike modulations consistent with
prediction error and counterfactual error signaling, OR (2)
there is another class of midbrain dopamine neuron
dedicated to the counterfactual term, OR (3) there is
an opponent to the dopaminergic reward prediction error
signal that releases dopamine or controls the release of
dopamine in striatal regions. This list is not biologically
exhaustive. In this opinion piece, we restrict our focus to
the possibility that the shadow system in possibility 3 are
serotonergic neurons from the nucleus raphe and we lean
on the fact that they can load dopamine into their term-
inals [4].
Cross-loading between serotonin and
dopamine: inspiring the P and N model
There is solid neurobiological evidence that dopamine
and serotonin are capable of cross-loading into one
another’s terminals [4,5,6]. For example, Zhou
et al. [6] have provided compelling evidence that, under
a multi-week regimen of selective serotonin reuptake
inhibitors (SSRI), serotonin loads into dopaminergic
terminals through dopamine transporters. Whether this
displaces the dopamine carrying capacity of these term-
inals is not known quantitatively but one class of behav-
ioral side effect of selective serotonin reuptake inhibitors
(SSRIs) resembles Parkinsonian symptoms; an observa-
tion consistent with a diminishment in dopaminergic
transmission. In a another recent report, Gantz et al.
[5] showed that under L-DOPA treatment, serotonin
terminals originating from neurons in the dorsal raphe
nucleus contributed directly to dopaminergic transmis-
sion. This cross-loading has important downstream con-
sequences including the fact that there are two dynamic
sources of dopamine fluctuations — dopaminergic term-
inals and serotonergic terminals. In the event that the
parent dopamine and serotonin neurons encode different
operations, these operations would be combined due to
cross-loading. This is exactly the possibility that we
offered above to explain the human dopamine data
recorded in humans during the simple betting game
(Figure 1) adding the hypothesis that the counterfactual
signal encoded in dopamine is likely being carried by
modulation of serotonergic neurons but translated into
both dopamine and serotonin co-release.
Below we build on this cross-wiring hypothesis to suggest
that the reward prediction system thought to be repre-
sented in part by mesostriatal dopaminergic projections is
mirrored by an aversive prediction system carried to the
same target neural structure by serotoninergic fibers.
Furthermore, these systems may mix their computations
through neurotransmitter cross-loading, here termed soft
cross-wiring to emphasize the computational composition
idea rather than just a physiological eventuality. These
biophysical possibilities are consistent with the data
shown above but not necessitated by them; however,
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Sequential betting game against a market. Subjects bet between 0% and 100% of their total on each trial, a ‘price’ variable changes (goes up or
down), and the subject gains or loses that fractional amount of their current total. There are no time limits between choices [1].
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we show that soft-cross wiring also suggests a different
way to conceive of valence processing in terms of efficient
encoding hypotheses more typical of visual and auditory
analyses [7,8,9,10,11,12,13].
To summarize briefly: Humans with Parkinson’s disease
exhibit subsecond striatal dopamine fluctuations that
encode a combination of a reward prediction error signal
and a counterfactual error signal with the latter signal type
consistent with a near antipode of the reward prediction
error (in the restricted case of the simple game used here)
[1]. Here, such an antipode of a reward prediction error
signal would be an aversive prediction error signal, which
for example fluctuates above and below baseline in a
fashion nearly opposite to the reward prediction error
signal. The simplest way to account for this oppositely
directed prediction error is to suppose that this other
system is learning to predict future aversive stimuli in
a manner analogous to reward prediction accounts typical
of dopamine systems [14]. If so, then the soft cross-wiring
that we sketched above has new and very interesting
consequences for valence processing in general.
Separating P and N error signaling from
neurotransmitter semantics
We pursue these ideas by assuming that there are two
neuronal systems, P and N (positive and negative), capa-
ble of learning and emitting prediction errors in future
rewards and aversions respectively and suggest that the
neurotransmitter couplings between these systems can be
seen as one way to transform from separate P and N
systems, let us call that the {P,N} bases, to a different basis
{(P + N), (P  N)}, which act respectively as a salience
channel (P + N) and a value contrast (P  N) channel (see
Figure 3). This means that salience processing and value
contrast processing would be handled by the combination
of dopamine and serotonin and not just one system alone;
a fact that may also help to explain the odd relationship
between dopamine, salience and reward prediction error
signaling generally.
In this section, we first review briefly current reinforce-
ment learning (RL) models [15] of how modulations in
spike activity in dopaminergic neurons report on predic-
tion errors in future reward [16–18] and we build a similar
but nearly opposite case for a system that would shadow
the dopaminergic system in terms of predicting future
aversive stimuli [2]. One new step is to assume that all
states can be independently and concurrently assigned
positive (reward predicting) and negative (aversive pre-
dicting) value.
To learn from experience a mobile organism must pos-
sess adaptive mechanisms for valuing the world in the
face of changing contingencies; an almost self-evident
rendering of what it means to adapt to and learn from a
variable world. One general approach to learning about
rewarding and aversive events is called reinforcement
learning (RL), which focuses on how an agent responds
to, stores, and plans actions around the rewards and
aversives it encounters or could have encountered
[15]. A typical reinforcement learning (RL) account of
reward learning in animal brains begins with a simple
hypothesis about how an organism should value its future
states, and moves on to suggest how, given that model of
valuation, the system should update the valuation of its
states based on experience (for overviews see [16–20]).
This paper avoids a detailed discussion of how such
systems organize the mapping from valuations to actions
in order to emphasize the conditions under which our
proposal — soft cross wiring — engenders downstream
computational consequences.
In reinforcement learning, the main valuation hypothesis
is that a learning agent should assign a value VP to its
current state St according to the discounted rewards
expected from that state into the distant future [15].
Here the superscript P indicates positive valence. This
simple hypothesis embeds the Markovian or history-in-
dependent assumption — how a state is acquired is not
relevant to its valuation, only the future that it portends
influences its value:
VPðStÞ ¼ E½rt þ grtþ1 þ g2r tþ2 þ     (1)
E is the expected value operator, g is a discount factor set
somewhere between 0 and 1 that devalues rewards
expected to the future of the current state, and t is
discretized time. According to the same idea, the valua-
tion of the next state St+1 follows similarly:
VPðStþ1Þ ¼ E½r tþ1 þ gr tþ2 þ g2rtþ3 þ     (2)
From these expressions, one arrives at a form of the well-
known Bellman equation 4 that relates the value of the
state at one moment to the value of the state in the next
moment (allowing that we are not specifying any proper-
ties of this state transition in this paper):
E½rt  þ gVPðStþ1Þ ¼ VPðStÞ (3)
If a learning agent (like a rat) was using a similar scheme
to value its states then a natural ‘error signal’ would be the
difference between the right and left hand sides of
Equation 3:
dPt ¼ E½r t  þ gVPðStþ1ÞVPðStÞ (4)
This kind of error signal can be used simply and directly
to update parameters used to estimate the value function:
VPðStÞ  VPðStÞ þ adPt (5)
There is now substantial evidence that a subset of
mammalian midbrain dopamine neurons encode dPt into
Value neurotransmitter sharing Montague et al. 123
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perturbations in their spike rate [16–20]. Hence, dopamine
neurons communicate a spike-rate-change-encoded pre-
diction error dPt to their terminals and the neurotransmitter
in those terminals converts dPt to a diffusive signal that
communicates through the tissue to appropriately selec-
tive downstream effectors (e.g. dopamine receptors). Few
if any models have explored the reason or limitations of
this dissipative step for the particular case of a reward
prediction error dPt .
An exactly analogous argument could be made for the
learning of future aversive stimuli and the way a state
should be valued in terms of predicting this discounted
aversive future. The hypothesis here is that the potential
negative value VN associated with a state St is the
expected value of exponentially discounted aversives
expected from St forward into the distant future:
VN ðStÞ ¼ E½at þ gatþ1 þ g2atþ2 þ     (6)
which leads to the same Bellman equation as above (but
framed on future aversive stimuli) and yields its own error
signal dNt :
dNt ¼ E½at  þ gVN ðStþ1ÞVN ðStÞ (7)
Which can be used to update the value function over
aversives:
VN ðStÞ  VN ðStÞ þ bdNt (8)
The basic idea for the two systems is that each updates
its predictions of future rewards and aversives separately
but these predictions combine to produce a composite
error signal encoded as signed pertubations in baseline
spike rates, dPt along the P pathway and d
N
t along the N
pathway, which would translate into signed fluctuations
in dopamine and serotonin release. The extracellular
space ‘adds up’ the ensuing changes in these transmit-
ters to encode dPt þ dNt . Similarly, receptors sensitive to
either or both transmitters or that through intracellular
signaling converged on common targets could likewise
compose these signals in flexible ways. This composite
error signal is thus well placed to update an overall
value function VP(St)  VN(St). This conceptual framing
of the valuation and prediction problem (without com-
mitting to any specific representation) closely resembles
Daw et al. [2] except that it possesses two separate
value functions and thereby entails two signed predic-
tion error signals. The explicit consideration of the
prediction errors as diffusible signals within a common
space allows them to act alone or together in a manner
dependent only on the response elements present. A
new possibility occurs when one considers what happens
when one neurotransmitter, say dopamine, carries infor-
mation related to both prediction errors dPt and
dNt . Conversely, each prediction error is encoded as a
mixture of serotonin and dopamine.
One important assumption in this account is that neu-
rotransmitter fluctuations (e.g. dopamine, serotonin
fluctuations) are already understood by downstream re-
ceptor systems as updating respectively future predic-
tions about positively valenced and negatively valenced
stimuli. So one key conceptual step is to separate the
error encoding by the parent neurons (expressed as
perturbations in spike rate) from the neurotransmitter
semantics (as interpreted by downstream effector
mechanisms).
The P  N basis
We have presented a caricaturized view of valence pro-
cessing by considering the dopamine system as the posi-
tive valence pathway P and separately imagining that the
serotonin system is the negative valence pathway N. We
have sketched how P and N could direct reward and
aversive prediction learning in fashion aligned with rein-
forcement learning models generally, and argued for
midbrain dopamine and serotonin systems as a possible
substrates. This style of model has been used fruitfully to
understand a wide range of behavioral data and has
informed possibilities for mapping these models to sup-
porting biological substrates [15,21–24]. However, the
simple opponency claim for the two systems has serious
difficulties. The most glaring is that it appeals to the
dopamine and serotonin systems as being near-antipodes
to one another and thus apparently redundant. There are
many contexts where a resource-constrained system
should show redundancy as an inefficiency, and this
perspective has been explored for decades in sensory
systems[9,10,11,12,13]. We consider this apparent val-
ue system redundancy from a different perspective and
motivate why such systems might want to share neuro-
transmitter as the data suggest they do.
As suggest in Figure 2, the P and N pathways represent
separate positive and negative valence prediction ca-
pacity. Here we show a depiction of the bi-directionally
coupled P and N systems where perturbations in
the dynamics of the two neurotransmitters (dD(t),
dS(t)) are controlled by both the spike-encoded reward
prediction errors dPt and the spike-encoded aversive
prediction errors dNt :
dD tð Þ
dS tð Þ
 
¼ a 1b
1a b
 
dPt
dNt
 
þ ND tð Þ
NS tð Þ
 
(9)
a is the fraction of the native neurotransmitter (labeled D
here for ‘dopamine’) in the P pathway that is present in
the P terminal and the remainder (1  a) is assigned to
the N pathway terminal. Similarly, b is the fraction of
native neurotransmitter (labeled S for ‘serotonin’) in the
N pathway terminal and the remainder (1  b) is assigned
to the P pathway terminal. Noise terms ND(t) and NS(t) for
each transmitter include synaptic noise and unaccounted
for extrasynaptic sources/sinks for D and S.
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Equation 9 expresses two couplings: (1) the coupling of
spike-encoded prediction errors along P and N pathways
to perturbations in neurotransmitter release, and (2) the
neurotransmitter coupling between the two systems; a
feature we have termed soft cross-wiring. For a = b = 1,
the ‘normal’ situation ensues where dopamine and sero-
tonin separately carry the reward prediction error and
aversive prediction error information. Ignoring issues
about diffusion, this is the situation where the prediction
errors from moment-to-moment could be monitored sep-
arately by recording dopamine and serotonin simulta-
neously in the vicinity (receptors could do this). Once
cross-loading occurs because either or both alpha and beta
deviate from 1, then the prediction errors and the learned
weights that instantiate them become mixed. One can
then imagine wanting to unmix these signals or detect
both serotonin and dopamine in a combination that had
computational relevance. We explore this below.
One way to understand the nearly anti-correlated
responses of the P and N pathways is to imagine that these
systems’ sensitivities are close in order to discriminate
valence in a world where the positive and negative valua-
tions pertinent for survival are close. So let us take the
closeness as evidence of an adaptation to a tough set of
valence discrimination problems — ignoring the fact that a
nervous system does not simply discriminate raw valence
but instead assigns it to objects (including living objects),
which possess a range of other properties not considered
here. Consequently, the near redundancy along the P and
N pathways is not the best representation to process the
valence information since it wastes resources because of
the high degree of correlation between the systems. One
way to deal with this correlation is to decorrelate the
signals. One simple way to accomplish this is to rotate
to a different set of directions with the obvious ones being
P + N and P  N. Downstream receptors can easily effect
such a transformation either by direct binding or through
convergence onto intracellular signaling cascades. This
new {P + N, P  N} basis provides natural directions where
P + N is a salience signal and P  N a valence contrast signal. It
is important to note that both dopamine and serotonin
would be involved in coding the response along each new
direction. Taking the system in Equation 9 expressed in
Value neurotransmitter sharing Montague et al. 125
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Dopamine fluctuations in the human striatum encode the difference of reward prediction errors and counterfactual errors during a simple betting
game. Prediction errors are computed as fluctuations in outcome around a running estimate of the mean outcome (blue triangle indicates time
outcome is revealed). Counterfactual errors for this game were defined as the best/worst outcome minus the actual outcome or
1  rt  btrt = rt(1  bt) where rt was the fractional change in price Dpt/pt at trial t. The hypothesis is that dopamine transients encode a difference
between reward prediction errors and this style of counterfactual error. Notice that on gains, rt is positive and so the counterfactual mechanism
would have to subtract dopamine from the extracellular space. On losses, rt is negative and so the counterfactual mechanism would have to add
dopamine to the extracellular space. The dependence of dopamine changes on the bet bt is captured (qualitatively) by the term. This model
(subtracting the counterfactual term suggested above) is equivalent to assuming a separate signal that scales with rt and can add/remove
dopamine from the extracellular space relative to ongoing baseline levels. The reward prediction error pathway would scale with +rt and likewise
be capable of increasing and decreasing dopamine relative to baseline. Red traces are for outcomes where prediction errors were negative and
green traces are for outcomes where prediction errors were positive (error bars are SEM; see [1] for statistical details). At high bets, the
counterfactual term drops to 0, but grows as bets decrease, an effect that would add/subtract dopamine depending on the sign of the RPE.
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the {P,N} basis, we can rotate into the {P + N, P  N} basis
but keeping things expressed in terms of the changes
in transmitters to make clear how downstream effector
mechanisms could ‘sense’ valence responses along direc-
tions that incorporated an efficient encoding principle
[9,10,11,12,13]:
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Positive and negative valence prediction systems with soft cross-wiring. Valence predicting systems P and N help build representations of reward
predicting value (P) and aversive predicting value (N) according to standard reinforcement learning framework (Equations 1–8). There is substantial
evidence that midbrain dopaminergic neurons emit reward prediction errors dPt in this manner and there is scattered evidence that there is a near-
opponent system (N) that approximately anti-correlates with the dopaminergic system and is thus capable of the same kind of prediction but for
future aversive stimuli. Such predictions are ideally suited to inform an agent when to avoid stimuli or wait, and have been hypothesized to be one
substrate for conditioned inhibition. Serotonin (S) is thought to be one such opponent system to dopamine. The soft cross-wiring claim is that
these systems interact at the level of their neurotransmitter — by virtue of importing both transmitters at their terminals, each system influences
the extracellular dynamics of both transmitters. Soft-cross wiring can be thought of as a rotation in the abstraction depicted here for P and N. A
brief thought experiment helps. Imagine that for the P and N pathways, only P contained neurotransmitter (D, orange). Both pathways can still
encode prediction errors in changes in spike rate but only the P pathway translates this modulation into a change in neurotransmitter release
(dopamine) while the N pathway spikes run out into neurotransmitter-free terminals. Now start moving the dopamine one molecule at a time from
the P terminal into the N terminal and continue until all the dopamine has been moved. At this point the dopamine will now fluctuate as a function
of the aversive prediction errors produced in the N pathway. At the start of this transfer, dopamine fluctuated according to the reward prediction
errors because it was all in the P terminals. In the abstract valence space where P and N point in different directions, this procedure rotates the
signal carried by dopamine from the direction of P to the direction of N.
1ﬃﬃﬃ
2
p 1 1
1 1
 
dD tð Þ
dS tð Þ
 
¼ 1ﬃﬃﬃ
2
p 1 1
1 1
 
a 1b
1a b
 
drt
dat
 
þ ND tð Þ
NS tð Þ
  
(10)
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Multiplying out the left hand side shows in Equation
11 how downstream receptors could sense and respond to
dopamine and serotonin changes in a manner aligned with
P  N and P + N directions. They can simply respond to
the sum or difference in the fluctuations. This could take
place on the surface of a cell or using intracellular cas-
cades (both serotonin and dopamine couple to g-protein
coupled receptors for example):
We can express the situation, ignoring lots of potential
complications, as:
valence diff
salience
 
 dD tð ÞdS tð Þ
dD tð Þ þ dS tð Þ
 
|ﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ{zﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ}
receptors can sense
sum and difference
of 5H ; DA
 ðRotateÞðMixÞ d
r
t
dat
 
|ﬄﬄ{zﬄﬄ}
spike
encoded
errors
(12)
Notice that for the normal case of a = b = 1, there is no
mixing and the transformation here is a simple decorrela-
tion that would define a salience channel and a valence
difference channel. We have left off the issue of how to
adjust the sensitivity for the different directions in order
to focus on the idea of handling the valence processing
problem in terms of efficient encoding and separate value
systems (but see [10,11,13]). Once the mixing matrix
above moves away from the identity, then the system
mixes the information channels before releasing trans-
mitter and before decoding by downstream receptors. We
strongly suspect that this coupling has many conse-
quences only a few of which are sketched here, but it
is possible that such mixing allows the system to learn to
predict composite values of events that predict both
future rewards and punishments. The current idea and
its scant but supporting data suggest that both dopamine
and serotonin play an important information-bearing role
in learning such composite values.
There is a loose, but instructive analogy here with the
ecology of (color) vision and red/green cone sensitivities.
In primates, the peak spectral sensitivities of red and
green cones are very close (30 nm), which apparently
reflect the range of wavelengths where such discrimation
is computationally pertinent [10,11]. The proximity of
the spectral sensitivity peaks for R and G pathways is put
into perspective when the response properties of these
pathways is faced with measured visual statistics from the
natural world of the primate [10]. This work in vision
has relied in part on the capacity to capture images
of natural visual scenes easily and cheaply; however,
collecting natural reward statistics is subtle and ultimately
involves the fluctuating internal needs of the mobile
creature as they compare to the surrounding environment.
Summary
In summary, we began with a new measurement of striatal
dopamine in human subjects and found that existing
computational models of dopaminergic function were
inadequate to capture the possibility that dopamine
encodes prediction errors in reward and counterfactual
errors in reward. One trivial possibility is that some
simplistic element of the behavioral task (a scalar betting
game against a market) is accidentally creating a situation
for dopamine release that is not normal and only appears
to encode a bet-dependent counterfactual signal — this is
indeed possible since the subjects involved have a disease
of their dopaminergic system (Parkinson’s Disease). The
interactions that we posit here are quite specific in terms
of transmitters and neural elements; however, other work
has observed loosely similar coupling and suggested a way
to relate L-DOPA drugs used to treat Parkinson’s and
computational ideas about basal ganglia function [22–25].
We suspect that there are ways to connect the framework
sketched here to the ideas present in that work.
Several new possibilities emerge from the opinion pre-
sented here. First, we suggest that all stimuli have the
possibility to be assigned a composite of positive and
negative valence through the operation of two prediction
systems P and N (positive and negative) dedicated to
making this assignment. We think here of P and N as
directions in some valence space and claim that they rate
the reward-predicting or aversive-predicting valence of
situations that represent difficult valence detection pro-
blems. These same systems can share transmitter at their
terminals when those terminals happen to be sufficiently
close; a fact that immediately mixes reward and aversive
prediction information. In the context of the behavioral
task in Figure 1, this sharing provides the explanation for
the observed counterfactual component. As outlined
above, we see that soft cross wiring might also allow
the system to rotate parametrically from the {P,N} to
other bases; we considered one specific case. One possi-
bility is that the bet dependence of dopamine encoding of
prediction errors is directly related to the coupling coeffi-
cients in Equation 9.
We have completely avoided treating learned timing
among stimuli and the near-term rewards and punish-
ments that they portend. However, there should be
very interesting connections of this framework to related
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analyses in the visual system. For example, there is strong
evidence that independent objects in the visual world are
the source of natural visual scaling statistics [26] and that
visual cortical neurons can learn to respond to reward-
predictive visual cues [27]. We suspect that an analysis of
this coupling based on an efficient encoding framework
[11] would show that many levels of structure in visual
pathways should show predictable P and N channel mod-
ulation. It could even be the case that the exquisite
structural arrangements in the striatum can be understood
as natural ways to organize P and N information in a
fashion homologous to similar analyses in visual cortex
[11,13].
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